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A B S T R A C T 
Born of a sense of urgency and hope in T o r o n t o in 1960, Voice of Women ( V O W ) , a women's peace organization, quickly grew and gained 
renown as a national organization. A timely affiliation with Lester B. Pearson from 1960 to 1963 encouraged and boosted the organization in 
its early years. Less than one month after V O W was born, Pearson, the Leader of the Opposi t ion , formally proposed that Canada not accept 
nuclear weapons. However, when Pearson changed his m i n d as Prime Minister in 1963 and allowed nuclear warheads for Bomarc missiles 
into Canada, V O W became disappointed with h im and increasingly focussed on the international scene. 
Women's concern for a lasting universal peace has trans-
cended borders of countries and policies of governments.1 In 
the early 1960s a Canadian women's peace organization had 
hopes of helping to establish universal peace in the tense Cold 
War era. "By working through women's common interests 
and their instinctive concern for the human family," Voice of 
Women (VOW) sought "to help create a world climate of 
understanding favourable to mutual disarmament without 
fear."2 V O W ' s emphasis on the universality of motherhood 
and peace in the early 1960s linked the organization to 
women's peace groups throughout history. 
V O W quickly became international because of its message 
that women the world over, as bearers and nurturers of life, 
have common concerns for world peace. The group had 
national interests as well, although not al l was smooth sail-
ing for V O W on the home front. Internally, late in 1962 the 
organization suffered ideological and methodological con-
flicts. These conflicts revealed a continuing concern: from the 
start, the group claimed to be nonideological and nonparti-
san in concept and so it welcomed many different women 
with a broad spectrum of ideas about how to "make peace." 
In time, these women's differences over method revealed at 
least one deeper issue: was the group for deterrence or disar-
mament? Externally, V O W soon realized that it was difficult 
to remain "apolit ical" with its frequent contacts with polit i-
cians and involvement in political matters. These women 
became especially sensitive to this interplay of personal and 
political factors when they received support in 1960 from 
Lester B. Pearson, leader of the opposition Liberals. V O W 
rallied behind Pearson when he proposed his new defence 
policy for Canada but then became disappointed with him 
when he shifted his policy in 1963 to allow nuclear weapons 
on Canadian soil. Morally wounded by a trusted politician, 
in mid-1963 V O W rekindled its original zeal for international 
peace after a brief but deep immersion into Canadian politics. 
V O W developed out of a collective fear for the future of the 
world's children and the conviction that all women have a 
right to peace because of their common link to motherhood. 5 
V O W drew upon an earlier tradition of women's organiza-
tions: ever since the late nineteenth century a maternal con-
cern for others' children and the amelioration of society's ills 
have caused many women to look beyond the domestic world. 
Similar to women's associations in Canada at the turn of the 
century, V O W members had a biological rationale for their 
reform efforts.'1 Many Canadian women in 1960, like some in 
1900, had time to be involved in women's groups, and they 
saw association as a means for them to effect social change.5 
The Royal Commission on the Status of Women (1970) 
stated, of Canadian women in the 1960s, "[i]t appears to have 
been much easier for them to engage in politics indirectly 
than to run for elected office." In the 1960s women rarely 
served on policymaking bodies at any government level; 
instead, women saw their role as supportive and involved 
themselves in organized groups. During the 1960s, "political, 
occupational, professional, service, and civic groups seem to 
have grown at a faster pace than the adult population." 6 
Involvement in these groups was a way for women to express 
their fears, convictions and needs. It was an avenue for their 
political talent, a means of effecting changes in society. 
In the early 1960s the media aroused public sympathy and 
stressed international and national news. But, in spite of 
public uneasiness about the nuclear threat, many people 
nonetheless believed they could do something about it 
through direct action; they were hopeful about "participatory 
democracy."7 Lobbying government officials and demonstra-
ting became common practice for many North Americans. 8 
A l l these changes—women's involvement in associations, the 
media, and participatory democracy—affected the ways in 
which some Canadians protested the acquisition of nuclear 
arms. 9 These changes certainly were instrumental in the for-
mation and function of V O W . 
Like many organizations arising in response to a widely 
perceived threat, V O W received much init ial support but also 
experienced growing pains. Much of V O W ' s early strength 
was drawn from a timely affiliation with Lester B. Pearson, 
leader of the opposition Liberals until he became Prime 
Minister in A p r i l 1963. Immediately after V O W formation, 
Pearson made a formal statement of the new Liberal defence 
policy which opposed Canadian acquisition of nuclear wea-
pons. V O W quickly rallied behind Pearson and supported 
h im for the next two and a half years. However, when Pearson 
changed his policy in 1963 and agreed to accept nuclear 
warheads for the otherwise useless Bomarc missiles already 
on Canadian soil, V O W lost faith in him. 
This event was both instrumental in challenging VOW's 
fragile foundation of late 1962 as well as forming a less "vague 
and diffuse" focus for the group over time. V O W ' s reaction to 
the shift in Liberal policy provides an excellent example of 
the lobbying techniques of the still young organization, the 
importance of the debate over disarmament and deterrence as 
a means of avoiding nuclear war, and the friction within 
V O W created by partisan considerations. Moreover, this 
example shows how the timing of international political 
events uniquely influenced Canadian foreign affairs, and 
eventually V O W and the Canadian public. Interestingly, as 
Pearson's stance on nuclear weapons for Canada shifted, the 
interpretation of the original purpose of V O W also changed. 
In 1960 both V O W and Pearson were open about their 
support for each other. O n July 28, 1960, the date of V O W 
formation, Pearson sent a personal telegram to Josephine 
Davis, one of VOW's founding members, forwarding "greet-
ings to a l l those assembled and best wishes for successful 
deliberations and for your work for peace and justice." 1 0 
V O W sought Pearson's well-respected advice even before the 
organization was formed, and welcomed Pearson's wife, 
Maryon, as an honorary sponsor with open arms once the 
group was established. When rumors of a forthcoming shift 
in Liberal defence policy—from an unclear nuclear defence 
position toa lucid platform of "no nuclear arms"—coincided 
with the birth of the organization, V O W threw all its support 
behind the Liberal leader. 
On August 5, 1960, Pearson made an important statement 
on defence in the House of Commons, clearly stating his hope 
that Canada as a "middle" power could stay out of the nuclear 
weapons field. Pearson believed he had formulated a policy 
which would not question Canada's continental defence 
commitment nor default on Canada's obligations as a 
member of N A T O . Unless a final collective N A T O decision 
made at the highest political level of the council would agree 
to equip N A T O forces with defensive nuclear weapons, Can-
ada "should not even consider equipping her European 
N A T O forces with any kind of nuclear weapon," Pearson 
wrote to concerned Canadians. 1 1 
In essence Pearson was advocating a "new approach in the 
field of defence policy, a new orientation, a change of direc-
tion" in which Canada's defence policy would be strength-
ened "through its participation in the search for an endur-
ing peace which, after al l , is the only defence policy that really 
means anything in the long run." In the House of Commons 
Pearson said, in part, that 
If we lose the peace and slide into nuclear war—because 
we are more likely to slide into nuclear war than to get 
into it in any other way—then no other form of defence is 
going to save us, essential though those forms may seem 
at the present time. 
I think this change of direction which I have men-
tioned should always have in mind the desirability...for 
getting out of nuclear armaments completely, without 
getting out of our collective commitments. I think that is 
the best role for a middle power like Canada. 1 2 
Pearson believed that his proposed defence policy would 
assert Canadian independence i n foreign affairs policy-
making without defaulting on Canada's international obli-
gations. In fact, Canada should always be ready to muster its 
forces on land, sea, or i n the air for international service. 
This kind of statement by a prominent politician appealed 
to the sentiments of V O W members. The Leader of the Oppo-
sition was firmly stating his position against the acquisition 
of a nuclear arsenal for Canada's defence weapons. More than 
one hundred letters from Canadian women, many of whom 
wrote that they were V O W members, praised his antinuclear 
stance as contributing to better futures for their children and 
children's children. Many women began their letters to Pear-
son by stating their concern as "mothers and Canadians." 
Phrases such as the following dominated letters addressed to 
Pearson in August, 1960: "the dangers of radiation to our 
children and children's children"; "because of the great 
anxiety for the future of our children"; " i n view of the 
extreme dangers which wi l l come to men, women, girls and 
boys and little children"; "thank you from thousands of 
mothers and especially from me"; "Canadian mothers wi l l 
not sacrifice husbands, children and their own lives will ingly 
to assuage U.S. ego's [sic] in Pentagon"; "I am the mother of 
seven children, five of whom are boys, and earnestly feel that 
we mothers should not have to give birth only to be offered up 
in war or in the disasters of nuclear fallout"; "for the future of 
the human race"; " O n this peaceful Sunday morning as I sit 
and watch my three children quietly praying in the sun, I 
know I cannot fully relax with the sword of a nuclear war 
hanging over their heads."" The last paragraph of Marion 
Bacon's letter to Pearson, dated August 4, 1960, sums up the 
sentiments expressed in most of the letters. She wrote, 
Asa mother of two growing daughters, I want to feel that 
my girls have a chance to grow up and someday them-
selves be mothers of happy, healthy children.... Do not 
permit [Canada] to become a partner in nuclear arma-
ments, a joiner in the headlong race towards the annihi-
lation of humanity. Untold numbers of Canadian men 
and women like myself, concerned for the future of our 
children and our children's children, w i l l be standing 
solidly behind you. 1 4 
In addition to this maternal concern for the human race, 
the letters written in the summer of 1960 concentrated on the 
"insanity" and "mass suicide" of nuclear war. A few letters 
were quite graphic in their descriptions of the possible anni-
hilation of the human race, and these descriptions again 
stressed the responsibility of women as mothers. The univer-
sal tie among al l of the world's mothers was referred to often. 
One woman wrote that "as a mother...I feel keenly for moth-
ers of children, yet unborn, a l l over the world. This terrible 
insanity has to end." Another wrote, "What is to be gained by 
mangling other peoples [sic] children?" Yet another wrote 
that " T o accede in the preparation for a nuclear war which 
would be suicidal to the majority of the human race is to 
become as the lemmings and race madly to the edge of the cliff 
to throw ourselves to our deaths." 1 5 Some suggested that their 
maternal abhorrence of a nuclear war revealed a purer motive 
on the part of women as compared to men. One woman 
remarked: 
As a mother of two children I find the idea of nuclear 
conflict abhorrent, and I have decided to do what I can to 
support any action which wi l l turn the minds of men 
away from warfare.16 
Another woman strongly felt that "the world cannot be saved 
by men alone; you have tried, in your own way all of you," she 
wrote, and "now we the women...will try in our own way, and 
together, we wi l l succeed."17 
Evidently some V O W members were also Liberal party 
supporters. Several laudatory letters congratulated Pearson's 
antinuclear stance as a boon to the Liberal party. For exam-
ple, one woman from Vancouver wrote: 
I would like to congratulate you on the firm and realistic 
stand which the Liberal party has now taken on Cana-
da's defence policies. 
I am particularly pleased to note that the Liberal Party 
is now advocating that Canada be a non-nuclear power 1 8. 
A writer from Ontario began her letter to Pearson by referring 
to herself as a member of V O W , "as an independent person, 
housewife and mother." As such, she wished to express her 
"wholehearted support for the Liberal Party's stand against 
the acquisition of nuclear warheads." 1 9 One woman went so 
far as to "confess that [she was] one of the many Liberals who 
foolishly voted P.C. in '57 (but not in '58)." She continued to 
say "what a grievous disappointment [the Conservatives] 
have been," and ended by "wishing [Pearson] and the Liberal 
Party the best of luck in the future." 2 0 After applauding 
Pearson's stance another wrote that "I 'm fed up with Diefen-
baker, a lot more people likewise." 2 1 Like the examples above, 
most V O W members' letters to Pearson simply stated the 
horrors of nuclear war, their concern for the world's children, 
and their support for Pearson as a Liberal. Just organized in 
July, 1960, it seemed natural for V O W to support the Liberal 
party's new nonnuclear stance of August 1960. Perhaps this 
political angle of support for Pearson reflected the traditional 
role of women when it came to public matters: by attaching 
themselves to an influential and powerful man, women's 
burdensome feelings of helplessness and fear were reduced. 
Pearson personally answered several of these letters. In 
most replies he stated that he was "most appreciative of the 
sentiments expressed by the members of the 'Voice of Women' 
and their sincere desire to do everything possible to promote a 
peaceful atmosphere in the wor ld ." 2 2 Many V O W members 
received form letters and almost all were sent a copy of the 
House of Commons Debates of August 5, 1960, where Pear-
son outlined exactly how Canada could be an effective non-
nuclear, "middle" power. 
As long as he reiterated an antinuclear stance, Pearson 
continued to get V O W support. In a V O W "Rush Bullet in" 
dated March 30, 1962, the group praised Pearson for his state-
ment of March 28 which reiterated his position not to allow 
nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. He was quoted in the 
bulletin as saying, "I believe that we should have a defense 
policy which wi l l not require Canada to become a nuclear 
power in the sense of making, or using or securing nuclear 
weapons for her forces and which would be under national 
control." The bulletin urged members, "as an important 
voice," to indicate their support by writing to Pearson. 2 5 
As the year progressed V O W continued to make its own 
voice heard. T w o resolutions passed at the second annual 
meeting in September 1962 revealed that V O W members were 
abreast of current world issues. One concerned Cuba and "the 
threat to world peace brought about by existing American 
and Russian involvement in Cuban affairs"; VOWers wished 
"to make an effort to reverse this trend." Another centered on 
the Bomarc missile bases in Canada, asking "that the 
Government of Canada demonstrate the sincerity of its posi-
tion against the further spread of nuclear weapons by institut-
ing proceedings for the immediate removal of Bomarc missile 
bases."24 A press release dated October 13, 1962, for example, 
shows how the organization tried to pressure the government 
about nuclear weapons. It said that " L a Voix des Femmes 
vous pris instamment en ce moment critique de re-affirmer la 
position de votre gouvernement contre les ogives nucleaires."2 5 
While the Cuban crisis caused many V O W members to 
reaffirm their antinuclear stand, that same crisis precipitated 
key policy changes among Western leaders which eventually 
lost them the support they may have had from peace groups. 
The American government under John F. Kennedy discov-
ered that missiles were being shipped to Cuba and set up 
there by the Soviets. This revelation sent a shock of panic 
throughout the Western world. In Canada, the whole situa-
tion forced government and opposition leaders to reexamine 
Canada's agreements with the United States and to do so on 
very short notice. According to one writer, the Cuban missile 
crisis was the first crucial test of the integrated defence system 
of Canada and the United States.26 Internationally, the crisis 
was "the most dangerous East-West confrontation since 
World War II"; nationally, it showed Canadians that Diefen-
baker's ability to make sound decisions upon short notice was 
waning. 2 7 The affair awakened some Canadians to the fact 
that the Conservative government's defence policy lacked 
substance. Moreover, it created an uneasiness within the Con-
servative caucus. Some Conservatives strongly supported 
Howard Green who cautioned against blindly following the 
United States' lead, particularly since Kennedy had not kept 
the American commitment to consult Canada in view of such 
a crisis. Others felt that it was necessaiy to endorse imme-
diately the American decision to impose a naval quarantine 
of further shipments of military weapons to Cuba. 2 8 
It took Diefenbaker three days to state an official position 
for Canada, that of supporting the American government in 
the naval quarantine. His lack of enthusiasm and unwil l ing-
ness to back the American government without hesitation 
brought the Conservatives criticism, but not from V O W . 
Nevertheless, the issue deeply concerned V O W members. 
They got involved, prodding the United Nations Security 
Council to "send immediately a neutral fact finding mission 
to Cuba . " 2 9 V O W also sent a telegram to Diefenbaker on 
October 27, 1962, two days after his decision to support the 
United States. The group urged Diefenbaker to 
use all of Canada's prestige and resources to support the 
efforts of the acting secretary, U Thant, to mediate in the 
current dispute, upholding the right and the authority of 
the United Nations as the highest arbitrator of all inter-
national disputes in the world today. 5 0 
The Cuban crisis also forced Pearson to review his own 
stand on nuclear weapons. In November 1962 Pearson sent a 
"Memorandum to the Members of the Liberal Caucus Re: 
Foreign and Defence Policy." The contents reiterated that 
Canada should remain free of nuclear weapons: 
I regret that there was no consultation beforehand [from 
Kennedy]... May I assure you that I do not believe that 
Canada should accept nuclear arms under national con-
trol by herself or by the U.S.A. O n the contrary, I have 
consistently argued that the nuclear club should not be 
enlarged...5 1 
However, by the end of 1962 it was abundantly clear to 
Pearson that most of the military hardware which Canada 
had acquired was totally useless without nuclear warheads. 
The Bomarc missiles that Canada had agreed to accept as part 
of its N O R A D commitment had come into the country with-
out their nuclear warheads, and the debate over whether 
Canada should now accept the warheads escalated after the 
Cuban crisis. Pearson was keenly aware that Diefenbaker's 
cabinet was split over the question and that the Conservatives 
consequently presented a cloudy image to the Canadian elec-
torate. The Liberal leader saw that the time was opportune 
for presenting a clear policy, one which he thought would 
satisfy most Canadians that Canada was an "effective ally." In 
the months between the Cuban crisis and the election i n A p r i l 
1963, Pearson changed the position he had held since V O W ' s 
formation. Instead of maintaining that military considera-
tions did not require Canada to accept nuclear weapons, 
Pearson adopted a stance which honoured Canada's interna-
tional commitments to "accept...nuclear warheads." 3 2 It was 
a shame that Canada had made "nuclear commitments and 
then refused to discharge them."" 
Finally, Pearson was needled by a speech on January 3, 
1963 by the American general, Lauris Norstad, when Norstad 
arrived in Canada. The general bluntly stated that the Ameri-
can government was becoming increasingly impatient with 
the Canadian government's lack of policy. Pearson responded 
with a switch in his party's policy, but the public did not hear 
of it until nine days later because the Liberals needed time to 
iron out the subtleties of the policy change. A memorandum 
to Pearson by one of his top aides, Richard O'Hagan, dated 
January 7, 1963, stressed the importance of the t iming of 
Pearson's upcoming speech on defence policy. Furthermore, 
he emphasized the "shakiness" of the present world situa-
tion, commenting, "Cuba, Kennedy, Skybolt, and now in 
local terms, General Norstad have helped bring this whole 
picture into a shaky kind of focus." 5 4 He urged Pearson to 
state clearly his policy in his next speech. 
Pearson's modified nuclear defence policy, officially out-
lined in a speech to the York-Scarborough Liberal Associa-
tion in Toronto, stressed Canada's commitments of 1957 and 
1958 to N O R A D and N A T O to accept short-range tactical 
nuclear weapons. The Liberals maintained that the com-
mitments were entered into by the Canadian government 
under Diefenbaker and should be honoured. The Liberal 
policy was now one of "deterrent defence" which meant "the 
availability of nuclear tactical weapons in the face of an 
immediate vital threat or emergency." Cuba was cited as an 
example of "an immediate vital threat." In sum, the Liberal 
defence policy after January 12 included "Defensive Nuclear 
Weapons in N A T O and in N O R A D in order to fulfill Cana-
da's present commitments as a respected member of the Free 
World and in Defense of Peace, Security and Freedom." Pear-
son now believed that deterrence was "essential to the preser-
vation of peace."5 5 
The reactions to Pearson's new defence policy were numer-
ous. Many Canadians, including V O W members and some 
newspaper editors, felt the Leader of the Opposition was 
"waffling." In another of O'Hagan's memoranda to Pearson, 
dated January 23, 1963, the importance of clarifying the 
defence policy was stressed again: it was essential that the 
Liberals present a distinct alternative to the Conservatives, 
while not losing Liberal supporters.5 6 Since the Liberals 
wanted to present a solid image to the Canadian people—in 
contrast to the faltering Conservatives—Pearson repeated the 
party's position in a simplistic manner on several occasions 
after January 12. He restated his earlier concern that the 
government must be responsible to the Canadian people and 
that the Conservative government had failed in its responsi-
bility. The inability of the Minister of National Defence to act 
quickly in a crucial world situation 
underlines the confusion and conflict within a divided 
Cabinet. This continued unwillingness or inability of 
the Government to state a policy on defence in clear and 
forthright terms is an abdication of responsibility to the 
people of Canada and to this country's allies in the 
Atlantic coalit ion." 
Pearson was well aware of the opposition his speech of 
January 12 would arouse. In a letter to "J immie" Sinclair of 
Vancouver he wrote, "I am much encouraged by the many 
letters I have had similar to yours—but then there are also 
many who don't agree. The days ahead wi l l be difficult!" 5 8 
Pearson received numerous letters, written almost exclusively 
by men, welcoming his speech, but the majority of those 
questioning his consistency came from women. Many letters 
were from V O W members who condemned what they saw as 
a total reversal in Liberal policy. Before 1963 Pearson had an 
unequivocal nonnuclear stance and after 1963 he was advo-
cating the use of nuclear weapons. V O W felt it had been 
betrayed by a trusted advisor and political leader.5 9 A few who 
wrote were also members of the Liberal Party. One woman 
found it necessary to resign from her local Liberal Women's 
Association because of Pearson's speech. Pearson "respect[ed] 
the sincerity of [her] motives" even though he could not 
"respect the validity of [her] reason." 4 0 
Pearson's wife, Maryon, received several letters after Janu-
ary 12, 1963, the date of Pearson's speech. Almost as if she 
anticipated these letters, Maryon Pearson submitted a state-
ment to the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star on January 
14, 1963. It indicated that her "husband's statement on 
defence policy in no way conflicted] with [her] support of the 
V . O . W . as it was originally conceived," adding "We [VOW] 
are for disarmament, of course, but not for concessions in the 
name of peace which would mean the loss of freedom and 
even make war more, rather than less, likely." Along with her 
husband, Maryon Pearson believed Canada should honour 
its "commitment" to its "allies." 4 1 
Nevertheless, the letters of disagreement continued to 
arrive. Most correspondents wondered how she could support 
her husband's speech and be involved in V O W at the same 
time. Maryon Pearson replied to such letters in a general way, 
stating that her husband's main aim was peace as was VOW's . 
In a typical letter she wrote, 
I feel I must tell you...that I understand perfectly the 
decision arrived at by my husband in his statement on 
nuclear defence policy, with which I agree wholeheart-
edly. It is possible for me to do this and, at the same time, 
uphold the purpose of the V .O .W. which, after all , is 
peace.42 
But in March 1963 she sent an official message to V O W 
stating the organization had "changed" and that she "no 
longer agreed with its methods." One of the "changes" that 
disturbed Maryon Pearson was Therese Casgrain's resigna-
tion as V O W president to run as an N D P candidate in the 
upcoming election: 
[ V O W has] elected as a president someone well known 
for her political bias. This has been proved to be true by 
her recent resignation from V O W to become a candidate 
for the N.D.P. . . . I have been told that she instructed 
V O W members how they should vote. This in my opin-
ion ruins the purposes [of] V O W . 
She did not mention that her husband's policy had "changed" 
as well; evidently, politics played a larger part in the Pearson-
V O W connection as the election neared.45 
The polit ical impact of the Cuban crisis in Canada and 
Pearson's statement of January 12, 1963, contributed to 
Maryon Pearson's resignation from V O W . Changes in Pear-
son's defence policy and a more antinuclear V O W resulting 
from the organization's first years of struggles and growth 
combined to make an unhappy marriage between V O W and 
the Pearsons after a mere two and a half years. Having sup-
ported and advised V O W in the past, Pearson's enthusiasm 
now cooled. After al l , the Gal lup Pol l of December, 1962 had 
revealed that most Canadians—fifty-four percent—favoured 
nuclear weapons for Canada's armed forces, while thirty-two 
percent were against them. 4 4 Maryon Pearson, among others, 
found herself caught in the middle of it a l l . She could identify 
with V O W when it initially encouraged the study of issues 
bearing on survival in the nuclear age and sought to become a 
voice for the general concerns of Canadian women. But, 
V O W became a "more routine, and determined, pressure 
group against nuclear weapons," the Pearsons severed their 
formal ties with the organizations. 4 5 
Early i n 1962 Pierre Berton called the aims of V O W and 
similar groups "vague and diffuse." He observed their prim-
ary characteristic to be "groping for some alternative to 
nuclear disaster."4 6 Wi th in a year of this statement Pearson 
had given V O W something specific to attack. Pearson's new 
emphasis caused V O W to sharpen what others saw as its 
"vague and diffuse" focus. Although maintaining its original 
purpose, V O W ' s focus narrowed in a span of less than three 
years due to the impetus provided by current political events. 
The Pearson episode also caused V O W henceforth to concen-
trate its efforts more on international issues; as the organiza-
tion entered its fourth year its concern for global peace grew. 
Already at the V O W board meeting in September 1963 the 
agenda was dominated by proposals to encourage Canada to 
recognize mainland China, get V O W "observer status" at the 
United Nations, lobby for test ban treaties and, for the first 
time, be concerned about the "treatment of children in 
Vietnam." 4 7 
V O W learned a valuable lesson through its close associa-
tion with and reliance on " M i k e " Pearson. The organization's 
return to its original emphasis on global peace from overt 
support for a political party's policy was the result of its early 
growth experiences. In 1960, V O W had passionately pro-
claimed that "the force of our message must penetrate states-
men's minds so as to make real changes i n our world ." 4 8 As 
the interwoven pattern of public involvement in political 
matters developed i n the early 1960s, V O W members found 
themselves getting involved, too. One woman maintained 
that the more members worked, the more the group "realized 
[it] had to become involved pol i t ical ly ." 4 9 Originally a loose 
aggregation of women concerned for the future of their child-
ren, V O W emerged as a more mature and sophisticated lobby 
group with a clearly defined goal: world disarmament. From 
1963 on, Voice of Women was more wary about pledging 
support to a Canadian politician, and increasingly focussed 
its concerns on the international scene. 
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